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 government is prepared to stipuJate that defendant's contentions with
 respect to the administrator of the DEA's failure to abide by the CSA
 procedures and the faiJure to reclassify marijuana are correct.
 Finalty, if this court is prepared to ruJe that no showing of abuse of
 discretion in the refusal to abide by CSA procedures and to reclassify
 marijuana wouJd render the classification of marijuana within ScheduJe
 of the CSA invaJido Jn any other situation--which seems the likely
 situation here--an evJdentiary hearing is required° Further, as will be
 shown beJow, defendant will be entitled to dismissaJ of the entire
 indictment should his contentions be sustained.
 IV. IF THE DEA ADMiNiSTRATOR HAS ABUSED THE DISCRETION VESTED IN
 HIM BY 21 U.S.C. 811, THE iNDiCTMENT MUST BE DISMISSED UNDER
 THE PRINCIPLE FIRST ANNOUNCED IN UNITED STATES V. HUDSON &
 GOODWIN
 Before the criminal jurisdiction of the federal courts may be
 invoked, the Congress must enact a vaJid statute not only defining the
 elements of prohibited or commanded acts, but also fixing a precise
 punishment; without both, there is no crime.
 In denying the federal courts the commondaw power to define the
 eJements of crime, the Supreme Court stated that: "the legislative
 authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punish-
 ment to it, and dectare the court that shall have jurisdiction of the
 offense." United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, supr_i, 7 Crunch at 34.
 Over 100 years Jater, the Second Circuit affirmed the vaJidity of that
 ruling in Mossew v. United States, 266 F.Zd 18 (2d Cir. 1920). Still
 more recently, the Supreme Court held, in lg48, that where Congress had
 prohibited the conceaJing of an alien, but the penalty prescribed was
 too vague, the person who did the forbidden act committed no crime
 cognizabJe by the federaJ court. Accordingly, the defendant was
 entitled to dismissal of the indictment° United States v. Evans, 333
 U.S. 483 (1948).
 The principle that a crime consists not onJy of forbidden or
 proscribed conduct, but also of a preciseJy fixed penaJty, is
 universalJy recognized by the Sending criminaJ law scholars writing
 today. Thus, Professor PauJsen in the book which won the Coil award in
 1970:
 A crime is not merely any conduct forbidden by
 law; it is forbidden conduct for which punishment