norml23 - Page 75
Page 75
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scrutiny of the exercise of discretion by agency heads is mandatory
under modern federal administrative Jaw. Rt is particuJarly noteworthy
that none of the crucial cases which changed the law of judiciaJ review
of agency discretion so drastically has ever been mentioned in any of
the appelJate cases rejecting defendants' chaJJenges to particular
classifications of controJJed substances. Perhaps the reason Js that
criminal practitioners are, as a ruJer not famiJiar with administrative
Jaw; it may also be true, however, that the unprecedented inclusion of
administrative Jaw principles in a criminal statute has simply gone
unnoticed by the parties, the practitioners, and the courts which have
faced this issue.
2. Although the origin of the revoJution in the judiciaJ review
of agency discretion will probably never be ascertained, it Js _ikely
that Kenneth CuJp Davis' Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry
(1969) and Professor Jaffe's book entitled Judiciat Control of
Administrative Action (1965) at least crystallized, if not caused, the
ever-growing restrictions on unfettered agency discretion. In any
event, in eady 197i the Supreme Court announced that the presumption
of regularity to which an agency head's decision is entitled "is not to
shieJd his action from a thorough, probing in-depth review°" Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.So 4.02, 514.. (I971). Further,
the Court went on to say that:
The Court is first required to decide whether
the Secretary acted within the scope of his
authority. [Citation.] This determination nsturaJJy
begins with a delineation of the scope of the
Secretary's authority and discretion. [Citation. ]
Scrutiny of the facts does not end, however,
with the determination that the Secretary has acted
within the scope of his statutory authority.
Section 706(2)(A) requires a finding that the
actuaJ choice made was not "arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 1 hot in
accordance with the lawo"
Id. at 41 5-416.
The Supreme Court remanded the matter in Overton Park to the
district court for "plenary review of the Secretary's decision;" in so
doing, the Court noted that such review was to be based on the full
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