norml23 - Page 73
Page 73
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Mr. Justice Rehnquist, not surprisingly, took the most radical
position of all. He would hold that the wideJy divergent opinions of
the members of the Supreme Court as to-what kind of standard, proved,
by themselves, that the Congress had improperly delegated its
legislative function to an administrative agency° _d. at 2879. The
remainder of Justice Rehnquist's opinion consists of analysis of the
legislative history of the statute under scrutiny against the backdrop
of the odgJn, developments, and present content of the nondelegation
doctrine. In a characteristic tour-de-force of jurisprudential
reasoning, Justice Rehnquist concluded that American law has come fu[r
circle from John Locke's Second Treatise of Civil Government (1960),
through the era of excessive deference to Congressional delegation of
power to executive agencies, and back to the recognition that Locke was
right in the first place:
We ought not to shy away from our judiciaJ duty to
invalidate unconstitutional delegations of
legislative authority solely out of concern that we
should thereby reinvigorate discredited
constitutional doctrines of the pre-New DeaE era.
..Jndeed, a number of observers have suggested
that this Court should once more take up its burden
of insuring that Congress does not unnecessarily
delegate important choices of sociaJ poticy to
politically unresponsive administrators.
Id. at 2886. (Citations omitted)°
In two footnotes to the test just quoted, Justice Rehnquist cites
exampJes of the growing list of proponents for a return to a Schechter
Poultry/Panama Refining skepticism of overly broad delegations, as well
as examples of the contrary view most prominently associated with
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, that the courts shouJd focus on the
actions of the administrators to whom power had been delegated rather
than on the delegation from the Congress in the first instance.
In the course of his lengthy and biting analysis, Justice
Rehnquist identifies the three policy issues subsumed in the
nondelegation doctrine. First, the insistence that Congress enact the
laws insures that important choices of socia_ policy wi[_ be made by
the branch of our government most responsive to the popular wi&
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