norml22 - Page 15
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challenges a court must_ of course, be free
to reexamine the factual declaration.
_d0 at 38, n. 68° ___ _/__Q _l_/l____b____//___L___tes_ 396 U°S.
398, 90 S.Ct. 642v 24 L°Ed.2d 610 (1970); _loQk______, sup_.
When such evidence is presentedr the court must seriously
consider it in determining the validity of the challenged
legislation, and when such evidence is overwhelming, the court
may not rely on a presumption of _'reasonableness _' to sustain the
legislation° This is true for two reasons. First, the
presumption of legislative validity must be rebuttable; yet if
overwhelming evidence as to the irrationality of the legislation
is not sufficient to overcome that presumptions then the
presumption is effectively irrebuttable. More importantf the
scope of scientific and empirical knowledge is constantly
increasing, and society's definition of _'arbitrary _ and
"irrational" changes over time. As the United States Supreme
Court declared in HarDe_v0 Yir_ini_L__2_Q_/___Q_L2_ll____Q/2,
333 U°S. 663, 86 S.Ct. i079_ i039_ 92 L°Edo 1010 (1966)_ striking
down the poll tax even though it was 'San old familiar form of
taxationS':
[T]he Equal Protection Clause is not shackled
to the political theory of a particular era°
In determining what lines are
constitutionally discriminatory, we have
never been confined to historic notions of
equalitye any more than we have restricted
due process to a fixed catalogue of what was
at a given time deemed to be the limits of
fundamental rights Notions of what
constitutes equal treatment for purpose of
the Equal Protection Clause _iQ change.
It looked as though the courts were going to take particular
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