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 challenges a court must_ of course, be free
 to reexamine the factual declaration.
 _d0 at 38, n. 68° ___ _/__Q _l_/l____b____//___L___tes_ 396 U°S.
 398, 90 S.Ct. 642v 24 L°Ed.2d 610 (1970); _loQk______, sup_.
 When such evidence is presentedr the court must seriously
 consider it in determining the validity of the challenged
 legislation, and when such evidence is overwhelming, the court
 may not rely on a presumption of _'reasonableness _' to sustain the
 legislation° This is true for two reasons. First, the
 presumption of legislative validity must be rebuttable; yet if
 overwhelming evidence as to the irrationality of the legislation
 is not sufficient to overcome that presumptions then the
 presumption is effectively irrebuttable. More importantf the
 scope of scientific and empirical knowledge is constantly
 increasing, and society's definition of _'arbitrary _ and
 "irrational" changes over time. As the United States Supreme
 Court declared in HarDe_v0 Yir_ini_L__2_Q_/___Q_L2_ll____Q/2,
 333 U°S. 663, 86 S.Ct. i079_ i039_ 92 L°Edo 1010 (1966)_ striking
 down the poll tax even though it was 'San old familiar form of
 [T]he Equal Protection Clause is not shackled
 to the political theory of a particular era°
 In determining what lines are
 constitutionally discriminatory, we have
 never been confined to historic notions of
 equalitye any more than we have restricted
 due process to a fixed catalogue of what was
 at a given time deemed to be the limits of
 fundamental rights Notions of what
 constitutes equal treatment for purpose of
 the Equal Protection Clause _iQ change.
 It looked as though the courts were going to take particular

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