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 into questions of public policy" actually
 prevailed on the Court, how could the high
 bench determine when an exercise of the
 police power violated constitutional
 guarantees?
 Rosen, The Supreme COUr% and Social Science po 68.
 In Mugler Vo Kansas, 123 U.S. 623_ 8 So Cto 273, 31 L. Ed.
 205 (1887), Justice Harlan warned that not all exercise of the
 police power would be presumed constitutional:
 There ares of necessity, limits beyond which
 legislation cannot rightfully go ... The
 Courts are not bound by mere forms, nor are
 they to be misled by mere pretenses. They
 are at liberty--indeed_ are under a solemn
 duty--to look at the substance of things
 whenever they enter upon the inquiry whether
 the legislature has transacted tire limits of
 its authority.
 123 U.S. at 661.
 Later, with the rise of substantive due process, these
 principles became operative standards for judicial review. SeE
 Muller v. Oreqon_ 208 U.So 412g 28 So Ct. 324_ 52 L. Ed. 551
 (1908); Q_n_Winq v. Kirkendall_ 223 U°S. 59f 32 So Ct. 192_ 56
 L. Ed. 350 (1912) Buntin! v. Oregong 243 U.S. 426_ 375 S. Cto
 435, 61 Lo Edo 830 (1917); Stettler v. O'_ra, 243 U.S. 629, 37
 S° Cto 475, 61 Lo Ed. 937 (1917)o
 Even Justice Holmes_ though he advocaned judicial self
 restraint and constitutional neutrality (see Lochner v. New York)
 did not believe in the abstract or routine acceptance of the
 legislation declaration of facts. Such he observed_ are entitled
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