norml21 - Page 54

 Although the fact situation in Mill's time (1850_s) was not
 the same as the framers' time or the same as today_ his concepts
 have retained their vitality:
 (T)here is a sphere of action in which
 society, as distinguished from the
 individual, has, if any, only a_ indirect
 interest; comprehending all that portion of a
 person_s life and conduct which affects only
 himself, or if it also affects others, only
 with their freer voluntary_ and undeceived
 consent and participation° When I say only
 himself_ I mean directly, and if the first
 instance; for whatever affects himself, may
 affect others through himself .... this, then,
 is the appropriate region of human liberty°
 it comprises_ first the inward domain of
 c onsciousAess; demanding liberty of
 conscience in the most comprehensive sense;
 liberty of thought and feeling; absolute
 freedom of opinion and sentiment: on all
 subjects, practical or speculative,
 scientific, oralu or theological ....
 Secondly_ the principle requires liberty of
 tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of
 our life to suit our own character; of doing
 as we like subject to such consequences as
 may follow; without impediment from our
 fellow creatures, so long as what we do does
 not harm them, even though they should think
 our conduct foolish_ perverse, cr wrong.
 Thirdly, from this liberty of each
 individual, follows th_ liberty, within the
 same limits_ _f combin_ion amqn_
 individuals; freedom to unite, for any
 purpose not involving harm to others; the
 persons combining being supposed to be of
 full age, and not forced or deceived.
 Hill, sup_r_a, at 15-16 (emphasis added)°
 Mro Justice Brandeis, in a dissenting opinion which has
 since risen above mundane legalisms and attained independent
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