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 the Administrator's interpretation as reasonable. //d at 939 Petitioners do not, contend that any of these exceptions
 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense apply here° Instead, they assert that in ACT we gave only
 Cou_wi4 467 UoSo 837, 843-45 (1984) (court may not substitute cursory attention to the statutory interpretation argument
 its own construction of ambiguous statutory provision for whereas, in their view, the law of the case doctrine applies
 reasonable interpretation by agency of statute entrusted to only where the prior appeal has analyzed an issue at length.
 • We disagree on both counts_ First, our treatment of the
 its administration)). We were troubled, however, by three of
 the eight criteria and remanded the case "for an explanation statutory interpretation question was entirely adequate. Sec_
 as to how [these] had been utilized by the Administrator in ond, even summarily treated issues become the law of the
 reaching his decision." Id. at 940. In particular, we were case. In Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp,
 concerned over the apparent impossibility of meeting the 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988), the Supreme Court noted: "That the
 fourth, fifth, and eighth criteria, all of which assumed an Federal Circuit did not explicate its rationale is irrelevant for
 availability of marijuana for medical purposes that was pro_ the law of the case turns on whether a co_rt previously
 hibited by Schedule L _decide[d] upon a rule _f la-_'--which the Federal Circuit
 necessarily did--not o_ whether, or how well, it explained the
 On March 26_ 1992, the current Administrator issued the decision." In ACT, we decided that it was not "an unreason-
 order that is the subject of this appeal. See 57 Fed. Rego able application of the s_totory phrase [for the Administra-
 10,499 (Mar° 26_ 1992) CFina] Order"). He concluded, on tar] to emphasize the lack of exact scientific knowledge as to
 remand, that his predecessor had not in fact relied orb two of the chemical effects of the drug's elements." 930 F.2d at 939.
 the three _impossible" criteria; he explained the third; a_d,
 after applying new criteria, he again denied the petition to As noted above, our only concern, in ACT, was with three
 reschedule marijuana. Id. at 10,508. of the standards adopted by the Administrator and his possi-
 ble reliance on them. As a consequence, in remanding the
 IL DXSCL, SS_ON case, we asked him to explain how his decisic_n h_d been
 affected by those standards° In the Finn! Order, the present
 A. Law of the Case Administrator found that two of these criteria--the "general
 availability of the substance" and the "use of the substance by
 We held, in ACT, that the Administrator's interpretation of a substantial segment of ... medical practitioners"--played
 the CSA was reasonable. Under the "law of the case" no role in his predecessor's decision. See 57 Fed. Reg, at
 doctrine, appellate courts do not reconsider matters resolved 10,507o
 on a prior appeal in the same proceeding. 18 Wright &
 Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4478 at 788 (1981). Further, the Administrator found that his predecessor's
 The doctrine is not a jurisdictional limitation; rather_ it i conclusion that ma_uana failed to meet the third of the
 _merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse questioned criteria--"recognition of [the drug's] clinical use in
 to reopen what has been decided .... " Messenger v. ! generally accepted pharmacopeia"--rested on a determinao
 Andersos, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912). Thus, courts _ll recon- tion that marijuana lacked a known, repr(_ducible chemistry_
 sider previously decided questions in such exceptional cases See id. We had objected te the "recognition of clinical use"
 as those in which there has been an intervening change of standard only because it seemed to require widespread thera-
 controlling law, or new evidence has surfaced, or the previous peutic use of the drug_an impossibility for Schedule I sub-
 disposition has resulted in clear error or manifest injustice, stances. See ACT, 9_0 F°2d at 940. The Administrat(_r's
 18 Wright & Miller, § 4478 at 790. interpretation of that criterion meets our objection.

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