norml02 - Page 30
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I effect°" See 5 U.SoC_ 551(4) (APA definition of "rule_') o But
I even if this were an adjudication rather than rulemaking_ it is
clear that agencies may adopt principles of general applicability
I for the first time in an adjudications See National Labor
Relations Board v. Bell Aerospace Co. t 416 UoSo 267, 294 (1974)
("the Board is not precluded from announcing new principles in an
adjudicative proceedingS'); Securities and Exchanqe Commission v.
Chenery__Cq_rp__, 332 UoS. 194, 201 (1947) (Chener_L_II) (agency had
duty to decide specific case based on proper standards
"regardless of whether those standards previously had been
I spelled out in a general rule or regulation_) o The FOIA
i provision cited by petitioners does not prevent adoption of
general policies in specific case adjudications but instead
prevents enforcement actions directed against individuals based
on "secret" policies previously adopted. Cf. Stuart-James Co. v.
Securities and Exchange Commission, 857 F.2d 796, 800 (D.C. Cir.
The fact that the Administrator took no enforcement action
I against petitioners, who themselves initiated the proceeding by
filing petitions as '_interested part[ies] '_ (see 21 U.S.C.
I 811(a)), also precludes petitioners from showing that they were
i _'adversely affected _' by any purportedly secret policy, as
required to state a claim under 5 UoSoC. 552(a) (]) (D) o
Petitioners cite no case in which this FOIA provision was applied
in favor of a rulemaking participant as opposed to an party
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